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Government productive activities play unambiguously a prominent role in the 
new generation of endogeneous growth models. Both theoretically (after the work of 
Barro, 1990, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, and others) and empirically (see 
Aschauer, 1989, and the voluminous empirical literature that followed) government 
productive activities are widely recognized as key determinants of lung-run growth 
and productivity. Their positive spillovers are transmitted in the economy via private 
firms’ production function either as a flow (government productive services) or as a 
stock (public or infrastructural capital). 
The effect of public investment on private capital formation is a crucial public 
policy issue. Empirical research into this question was stimulated by Aschauer 
(1989a, b) who suggested that public capital has powerful impact on the productivity 
of private capital. Aschauer’s results were controversial and have generated 
substantial empirical research directed at determining the robustness of his position. 
While the evidence is mixed, there seems to be a consensus generally supporting the 
productivity of public investment, although suggesting that its impact is somewhat 
weaker than that originally proposed by Aschauer. 
The theoretical analysis of the productivity of public investment proceeds by 
introducing government expenditure as an argument in the production function, to 
reflect, among other reasons, an externality in production. Two formulations can be 
identified. Most of the existing literature treats the current flow of government 
expenditure as the source of contribution to productive capacity. For example, 
Aschauer and Greenwood (1985), Aschauer (1988), Barro (1989), and Turnovsky and 
Fisher (1995) do so in neoclassical Ramsey framework. Barro (1990) and Turnovski 
(1995) employ a simple ‘A-K’ endogenous growth model. While the flow 
specification has the virtue of tractability, it is open to criticism that insofar as 
productive government expenditures are intended to represent public infrastructure, 
such as roads and education, it is the accumulated stock, rather than the current flow, 
that is relevant. 
Despite this criticism, few authors have adopted the alternative approach of 
specifying productive government expenditure as stock. Arrow and Kurz (1970) were 
the first authors to formulate government expenditure as a form of investment. More 
recently, Baxter and King (1995) study the macroeconomic implications of increases 
in the stocks of public goods. They  derive the transitional dynamic responses of 
output, investment, consumption, employment, and interest rates to such policies by 
calibrating a real business cycle model. Futagami et al. (1993) extend the Barro 















We assume that the model consists of  N  identical agents. The individual 
consumer-producer agent chooses his consumption, C , and stock of private capital, k, 
to maximize the following concave intertemporal utility function:  
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The production function of the individual agent is: 
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and the Hessian matrix is negative definite. 
  We denoted  by S the productive services desired by the representative agent from 
government capital. These are represented by an Edwards  (1990) type function: 
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g K denotes the aggregate public capital, K denotes the aggregate private capital 
and α  represents the degree of congestion associated with the public goods. 
 The  case  1 = α  corresponds to a non-rival, non-excludable public capital good, 
that is available equally to each firm, independent of the size of the economy; there is no 
congestion .  
 The  case  0 = α corresponds to a phenomenon of proportional congestion, 
meaning that the congestion grows in direct proportion to the size of the economy. The 
cases  1 0 < <α , describe partial congestion. 
  With all agents being identical, capital stocks are related by: 
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where N is the number of representative agents (firms). 
  In this case, the function S regarding the services derived by the representative 
agent from the government capital, becomes: 
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So, function (4) becomes: 
) 8 ( ) , (
g K h k f y ⋅ =  
 
 



































δ - constant rate of consumer time preference; 
1 µ  - constant rate of physical depreciation of private capital; 
τ  - distortionary rate of income tax; 
M – lump sum taxation; 
 
  4For the beginning, we will assume that the variables   are exogenous. To 
deduce the optimal solution of the model (9) we  apply the Maximum Principle for 
systems with discrete variables . 
g
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  The Hamiltonian of the system is: 
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We denoted by  t ψ the dual variable of the system: 
The optimality conditions are: 
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The dynamic equation of the dual variable  t ψ  are: 
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We denoted by   the derivative of the production function with respect to the first 
variable. 
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The transversality condition is: 
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and the transversality condition becomes 
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The dynamic equation of the variable  is the following: 
g k
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where g represents the level of public investment in infrastructure, and  2 µ  represents the 
rate of government capital depreciation. 
 
The government finances its investment activities by using either distortionary or lump-
sum taxation, in accordance with its’ flow budget constraint: 
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3.  THE MACROECONOMIC DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM 
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  Given the degree of congestion, as parameterized by h, and the scale of the 
economy N, equations (20) represent an autonomous dynamic system in the two private 
variables, k and c, and the stock of government capital  . The precise nature of the 
steady-state equilibrium occurs when: 
g k
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The steady state government budget constraint is: 
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Assuming that all the parameters of the model are fixed, except the investments in the 
public capital, g, from equations (24a) and (24b) we deduce: 
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From equation (24b) we deduce: 
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From (27) we deduce: 
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. This means that the size of the 
private capital increases with the growth of public investment g. As concerns the 
behavior of private consumption c* with respect to public investment, g, we deduce from 
(24a): 
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In general, the first term in brackets is positive: 
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we deduce that 
 








which means that private consumption increases along with the increase of public 
investment. 
 
4.  THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
 
In the model analyzed in the previous section the level of investment ,g, was fixed 
exogenously. 
In this section, we try to deduce the optimal level for public investment. 
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Model (32) contains two state variables,  , as well as two decision variables, 
namely:   
g
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and the dynamic equations of the dual variables are: 
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  Taking into account the optimality condition (35), we deduce 
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To simplify, we assume that 
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In this case, from (38) it follows 
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  Relation (40) shows that the marginal productivity of private capital must be 
equal to the marginal productivity of public capital, multiplied by the congestion quotient 
h and with the scale quotient N. 
  From (40) will follow the relationship between public and private capital is: 
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  On the basis of the optimality condition (34), relationship (41) and the dynamic 
equations (32), we can calculate the optimal values of private consumption, as well as the 
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5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
The impact of public investment on private capital formation remains one of the 
important issues in macroeconomics. In this paper we have analysed the subject in an 
intertemporal optimizing market-clearing framework. The key feature characterizing 
our analysis is that we have treated the public good as taking the form of a durable 
capital good, subject to congestion. This view of government expenditure provides a 
more realistic approach to analyzing the intertemporal tradeoffs that public 
expenditure policy imposes on the private sector. 
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